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Warfield: Warfield: Response to Carrie Menkel-Meadow's Correspondences

Response to Carrie Menkel-Meadow's
"Correspondences and Contradictions
in International and Domestic Conflict
Resolution: Lessons from General
Theory and Varied Contexts"
Wallace Warfield, Ph.D.*
I. INTRODUCTION

In her article, Carrie Menkel-Meadow poses a question that has been the subject of debate in conferences, classrooms, and other fora, but never sufficiently
elaborated.' That is: "Does the field of conflict resolution have any generalizable
theories that 'work' across different domains of international and domestic conflict? Or, are contexts, participants, and resources so 'domain' specific and variable that only 'thick descriptions' 2 of particular contexts will do?"
The subject is yet another one of those quiet (and sometimes not so quiet) debates that tiptoes across the field of conflict resolution from time to time.' While
Menkel-Meadow is careful when she speaks of domains, to compare international
with international as well as international with so-called "domestic" (read American) conflicts, one is inclined to see the argument largely framed as the exportation of Western-generated theories abroad. As such, it raises intriguing and provocative questions about the complementarities of so-called Western styles 4 of
conflict resolution with those that occur in the more exotic international realm.
* Wallace Warfield is an Associate Professor at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution,
George Mason University. Warfield teaches theory and practice courses, conducts research, and continues to engage in a wide range of conflict interventions in the United States and abroad. Special
thanks are offered to the Conflict and Culture reading group whose vibrant discussions provided the
stimulus for this essay.
1. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Correspondences and Contradictions in International and Domestic
Conflict Resolution: Lessons from General Theory and Varied Contexts, 2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 319
(2003).
2. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES:

SELECTED ESSAYS 7 (1973).

By

"thick descriptions" Geertz means the importance for the observer to go beyond the immediate (and
apparent) interpretation of an event that is unfolding to look for deeper meanings or create "a stratified
hierarchy of meaningful structures." Id
3. One is reminded of the Susskind/Stulberg debate about the appropriate role of the mediator. See
Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. I
(1981); Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theoty and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind, 6
VT. L. REV. 85 (1981).

See also ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF

MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994) (taking

exception to the so-called "problem solving approach" supposedly embraced by mediation traditionalists).

4. 1 find it curious that the term "Western," is customarily applied to the United States, Canada, and
select European nations in the geopolitical sense, but is implicitly Americanized when it comes to the
field of conflict resolution, as if anything emanating from America a priori carries a hegemonic taint.
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Or, as Menkel-Meadow states, "[O]ur field of conflict resolution has little in the
way of generalizable propositions that work (explain, describe, predict, and prescribe) across all domains." 5
In this article, I would like to first spend a little time clarifying (or perhaps
muddying) what is meant by "domestic" and "international" when people talk
about conflicts and how they are resolved. Geographical and content-defining
terms tossed about cavalierly say more about competing hierarchies and elitism
than functional geopolitical designations. Next, I will suggest that part of the
problem is how we locate theory in this debate: What kinds of theories lend
themselves to generalization and which ones do not? And does the problem lay
with the theory or the theory interpreter?

II. WHAT IS MEANT

BY "DOMESTIC" AND "INTERNATIONAL" CONFLICTS?

When Menkel-Meadow refers to domestic conflicts and their resolution, she
links this body of occurrences and responses with "American." Indeed, in the
linguafrancaof conflict resolution discourse, the two designations of "American"
and "domestic" have become virtually synonymous. As has "international" with
any form of conflict and its revolutionary approaches applied outside of the
United States. Indisputably, this is a handy way to distinguish between forms of
conflict and conflict resolution approaches, particularly if there is an interest in
conducting comparative research. However, if one pays close attention to the
discourse that has accompanied the political growth of the field, what is really
heard is a resolute determination by the international relations community to distance themselves from those who theorize and practice in the United States. A
fleeing, if you will, from yet another hegemonic export of those "Americans."
Now of course, stories abound of American practitioners intervening in a socalled international setting, either directly in a conflicted situation or through the
modality of training, and applying techniques denuded of the culture they were
functioning in-the result ranging from an embarrassing oversight to a snafu that
could have serious repercussions for the lives and safety of participants. Yet it has
come to the point where hearing about the "American style" (of conflict resolution), triggers visions of a parade of horrors trailing closely behind.
Well, what is a domestic versus an international conflict? World War I1,
involving a number of countries on the Allied and Axis sides, was certainly an
international conflict, as are both the Persian Gulf conflicts. The current Central
African quagmire and the turmoil in the Middle East would certainly take up residence in this international domain as well. But what about the Brixton riots that
took place in London in 1985? Or recent conflicts between sectarian groups in
India? Are these examples of international conflicts or simply parochial conflagrations taking place in somebody else's backyard?
The point is not that the latter group of conflicts are not international (they are
not in a strictly definitional sense), but rather that the nomenclature gets conflated
when these terms are used by practitioners to locate themselves in the professional
field. When a practitioner describes him or herself as an international conflict
resolver, very few of these individuals are doing international conflict resolution
5. Menkel-Meadow, supra note I, at 320.
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in the strict definitional sense. Rather, many are conducting conflict resolution
training with specific groups that may or may not be in conflict with one another
or some other form of intervention, but at best tangentially related to international
conflict resolution. In short, the term and application have become a kind of short
hand for anyone who's doing anything outside of the United States.6
It would be interesting to ascertain if practitioners of conflict resolution from
other countries are engaged in a similar facileness when they do various forms of
intervention outside of their home countries. For example, had a British practitioner sought to intervene in the gang conflict between Mexican American and recently arrived Mexican immigrants and Puerto Ricans that took place in Chicago's
west side in the mid-1990s, would that individual consider himself to have been
doing international conflict resolution? Or is this a peculiarly American orientation?
This geographic ambiguity is related to the similarities and/or differences of
domain comparison. If an external intervener analyzes a conflict in another country, where all the actors are local, and determines this to be a domestic conflict,
then will this individual be looking for similarities with nativist conflicts that she
or he is familiar with, or will differences be the guiding analytical frame? In other
words, should the domain designation drive the analytical frame in one direction
as opposed to another? Or, should we be looking at other variables that have the
potential to provide richer descriptions and explanations? As Menkel-Meadow
points out in her discussion of the New York City Police Department hostage
negotiations, 7 context does matter. But it is not so much a geographical context or
even a case typology context, as it is a context of a situational dynamic that matters. What is the dynamic situation unfolding between conflicting parties that
invites analytic comparison and becomes the basis for third party action?
For example, Menkel-Meadow is correct in suggesting that hostage negotiators are guided by contingency-driven hypotheses, and that there are contextual
differences between that situation and a multi-party problem-solving workshop
that explores deep-rooted causal factors.8 But there are also relevant similarities.
For example, she indicates that hostage negotiators noted the importance "of keeping parties talking." 9 I would argue that in problem solving workshops there are
contingent moments when it is important to keep parties talking as well. The
point of comparison is not the typology or location, but the dynamic interaction
that is taking place between parties in a conflict situation. The important context
in this comparison is how you "keep parties talking" rather than what you do.
And it is here where both obvious and subtle differences emerge. By the way, I
am not so sure that our police hostage negotiators were not using theory. Periodically during the discussion, one or more of the academics would suggest a theory
0
that the negotiators were using. Typically, they would respond with an example.'

6. 1bear no small burden of responsibility in adding to the obfuscation, as I have been involved in a
fair amount of "international" conflict resolution and have even caught myself fudging the definition.
7. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 327-29.
8. Id
9. Id.
10. See Jack Cambria et al., Negotiation Under Extreme Pressure: The "Mouth Marines" and the
Hostage Takers, 18 NEGOTIATION J. 331 (2002).
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This is an indication they were using theory heuristically if not articulating it in
the academic sense.
One early work that looked at similarities and differences of conflict conditions and responses, compared the previously mentioned riots in Brixton and other
surrounding districts of London with the riots (or community conflict) that
occurred in Miami-Dade County, Florida in 1980 and 1982." Certainly there
were differences between the two riots, but they existed symbiotically with similarities. I will mention just two of these similarities that were relevant to the understanding of conflict dynamics.
Although both countries are democracies, the political culture of Great Britain
with its emphasis on value patterns of ascription and particularism, produce a kind
of hierarchical tribalism based on class, region, and club affiliation.' 2 These behaviors are not conducive to a sense of inclusion, despite government policies
designed to produce a view that "we are all British."' 3 In the United States, value
patterns of universalism and achievement 14 emphasize the worth of the individual
and constitutionalize a belief that all are equal as Americans. There is no need for
an exhaustive historical review of the civil rights struggle to erase this fiction.
The irony of the Civil Rights struggle with respect to Miami-Dade, is that judicial
and legislative victories produced outcomes
that reinforced social and economic
5
deprivation rather than eradicated it.'
Both locales were the recipients of significant immigration flows in the 1960s
and 1970s, and in both cases, newly arrived immigrants tended to settle in impoverished neighborhoods. However, there were demographic differences that influenced participation in the conflict and the ideology of the protest groups that participated. While African Americans had historically lived in Miami-Dade, the
region experienced a significant influx of Cuban immigrants after the revolution
that brought Castro to power. These two groups had existed in Miami-Dade, living in separate communities with little inter-mixing. The riot was essentially racial and anti-authoritarian, pitting mostly poor African Americans against a predominantly white police force representing establishment hegemony. Brixton and
other London districts affected by those riots reflected a polyglot of ethnicities
with Asians, African Caribbeans, and whites, often living in the same communities. Interestingly, these disturbances were not defined as race riots.
The similarities between the conflicts are also important for the work of a
comparative conflict analyst. Both riots lend themselves to a theoretical perspective rather colloquially called "Two Tap Roots and a Triggering Incident." 6 This
concept was formulated by the U.S. Justice Department's Community Relations
i1. See COMMUNITY DISORDERS AND POLICING: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN ACTION (Tony F.
Marshall ed., 1982) [hereinafter COMMUNITY DISORDERS AND POLICING].
12. See SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, THE FIRST NEW NATION: THE UNITED STATES IN HISTORICAL &
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 209-24 (1979).
13. For an interesting discussion of this, see GARY YOUNGE, NO PLACE LIKE HOME: A BLACK
BRITON'S JOURNEY THROUGH THE AMERICAN SOUTH (2002).
14. LIPSET, supra note 12.

15. U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Confronting Racial Isolation in Miami (1982).
16. COMMUNITY DISORDERS AND POLICING, supra note 1I, at 169-73.
18. For the most recent publication of this concept, see U.S. Dep't of Justice Cmty. Relations Serv.,
Avoiding Racial Conjlict: A Guide for Municipalities(1991) [hereinafter A Guidefor Municipalities].
In it, the "tap roots" are referred to as "community dynamics." Id. at 3-4.
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Service in the 1970s to help guide field conciliators and mediators to develop
conflict responses ranging from crisis management to more reconciliatory interventions. 18 At the meta-theory level, Tap Root (TR) 1 is a general perception by a
low-power segment of society that the system, as constructed by the more powerful and dominant members of that society, is inherently oppressive and discriminatory. 19 As such, TR I borrows liberally from Galtung's theory of structural
violence. 20 At the meso-level, TR 2, there is a lack of confidence by this same
oppressed group in the interests and capabilities of public and private institutions
to provide adequate redress for their grievances. 2' Finally, at the micro level,
there is invariably some triggering incident. 22 In the Miami-Dade riot, the triggering incident was perceived to be excessive use of police force against an African
American male. In Brixton, a triggering event was an attack on Asian residents by
white skinheads. The latter causal element, or triggering incident,
generalizes to
23
Horowitz's work in his study of deadly ethnic riots in India.

III. A THEORY ABOUT THEORY GENERALIZATION IN CONFLICT
RESOLUTION
If the reader is still with me, this person will have discerned that I am a cautious fan of generalizable theory. I see a danger of over complexifying the
uniqueness of conflicts as well as the risk of over generalizing or seeking commonality. In either case, there is no need to throw out the proverbial baby with the
bathwater. To help us wrestle our way out of this semantical tangle, I offer a
conceptual model that I take to be generalizable to all conflicts and that aids in
giving direction to circumstances where other theories can be generalized and
where differences should be paid attention to.
In their fascinating study of gender and workplace disputes, Patricia
Gwartney-Gibbs and Denise H. Lach note that all disputes and conflicts have
three components: origins, processes, and outcomes. 24 This can also be depicted
as a causal path model:
Origins
01

-

Processes
X

-

Outcomes
- 02

19. Id. at 3. The guide names the first community dynamic, "Perceived Disparity of Treatment." Id.
20. See Johan Galtung, Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, . PEACE RES. 6 (1969).
21. A Guide Jbr Municipalities, supra note 17, at 4. The guide names the second community dynamic, "Lack of Confidence in Redress Systems." Id.
22. Id. "A triggering incident is a tension-heightening event that catalyzes discontent and turns it
into civil disorder." Id.
23. Donald L. Horowitz, Speech at the U.S. Institute for Peace (Feb. 2003). See also DONALD L.
HOROWITZ, THE DEADLY ETHNIC RIOT (2001).
24. Patricia A. Gwartney-Gibbs & Denise H. Lach, Workplace Dispute Resolution and Gender

Inequality, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 187 (1991).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

5

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2003, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 7
JOURNAL OFDISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 2003

A. Origins
Origins speak to how a conflict begins. Anyone who has familiarity with different forms of conflicts, ranging from the simplest 5 dyadic interpersonal dispute
to enormously complex entanglements such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
knows that the interpretation of origins is a social construction depending upon
where an affected party stands in relation to the issues. The important thing about
the origins component of the model is that it both affects how parties respond to a
conflict (think sectarian violence in Northern Ireland for example), as well as the
choice of process modalities of the intervener, the third party at the metaphorical
table.2 6
B. Processes
Processes deal with how a conflict will be pursued. Such processes range
from consensual settlement through negotiations by the parties themselvesvarious forms of third party-assisted modalities such as facilitation, mediation,
and the proliferated variations that have evolved over the last decade or so, 27 to
more formal and decisional roles played by arbitrators, judges, and institutional
managers.
C. Outcomes
Outcomes relate to how a conflict "ends," but the meaning of "outcome" can
vary widely. Conflicts can "settle" in the sense that parties reach an agreement
unassisted or otherwise, that reflects their interests or ones imposed upon them by
a formal decision maker. Outcomes can produce escalation of the conflict, usually
in response to a precipitating event. We saw this in the Palestinian-Israeli conflagration when Sharon went to the Temple Mount in September 2000, producing the
second Intifada. Outcomes can also be manifested in a "power over" fashion
when one party defeats his or her adversary. We saw this when Britain defeated
Argentina in the war over ownership of the Faukland/Malvinas Islands. Curiously, one author thinks of this kind of outcome as conflict de-escalation. 8
Where the field of conflict resolution has gone astray, is in the creation of a
professional dictum that conflates "agreement as outcome" with the "ending of the
conflict." I can remember the premature celebrations that took place after the
Oslo agreement, which sought to determine the outcome of the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict. Similarly, in the seemingly never-ending Liberian civil war, parties to
that conflict signed fourteen peace agreements, and as of this writing, the conflict

25. I use this term advisedly, since experience has borne out there is no such thing as a "simple"
conflict.
26. P. H. GULLIVER, DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 209-31
(1979).
27. See CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS:
PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR
RESOLVING CONFLICTS 41-77 (2d ed. 1996).
28. LOUIs KRIESBERG, CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICTS: FROM ESCALATION TO RESOLUTION 190-233

(2d ed. 2003).
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has not only not ended, but has actually re-escalated.29 Similarly, in studies of
domestic relations disputes, these disputes were categorized as "resolved" when
agreements were reached,3 ° ignoring the relational implications of outcomes.
Indeed, Terrell Northrup argues that despite the conflict resolution field's claims
that the focal point of practice is relationships, conflict resolution theory (and the
practice it generates) is driven by identifying and resolving party self-interest.31
IV. LOCATING THEORY GENERALIZATION
With these brief definitions in mind, I suggest that generalization resides most
comfortably in the realm of theories about origins. And while the arena of processes requires more careful attention to differences as opposed to similarities, it is
possible to replicate from one conflict domain to another. Length restrictions
constrain me from indulging in an exhaustive treatment of conflict origins theories, but I would offer at least one for discussion.
Basic Human Needs Theory
Menkel-Meadow is right in her observation that a major evolution in the field
of conflict analysis and resolution was understanding the importance of getting
beyond parties' positions to understand their interests as a way to broaden the
possibilities for reaching agreements. 33 Going further, Basic Human Needs theory, arguably first offered by Abraham Maslow in his hierarchy of needs,34 and
elaborated on by a number of theorists (particularly John Burton for the conflict
analysis and resolution field,) 35 urges the observer as intervener to probe beneath
interests for an even deeper understanding of the conflict. This is an explanatory
construction that Kevin Avruch and Peter Black have likened to an archaeological
dig.36 If we look closer at this evolutionary theory development, we see that the
metaphor, and what it seeks to illuminate, comes close to Geertz's call for "thick
' 37
descriptions."
29. See Friends of Liberia, Observation of the 1997 Special Elections in the Republic of Liberia:
Final Report and Evaluation (Aug. 22, 1997) (on file with author).
30. See Victor D. Wall, Jr. & Marcia L. Dewhurst, Observations of Gender Related Differences in
the Mediation of Conflict (unpublished paper from Conference in Gender Conflict at George Mason
University in Fairfax, Virginia) (Jan. 18-19, 1991) (on file with author).
31. Terrell A. Northrup, Relationality and Self-Interest: The Implications of Gender for Conflict
Theory (unpublished paper from Conference in Gender Conflict at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia) (Jan. 18-19, 1991) (on file with author).
33. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed., Penguin Books

1991)(1981).
34. See ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY (1954).
35. See John W. Burton, Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy, in CONFLICT RESOLUTION
THEORY AND PRACTICE: INTEGRATION AND APPLICATION 55 (Dennis J.D. Sandole & Hugo van der
Merwe eds., 1993) [hereinafter CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORY AND PRACTICE].
36. See Kevin Avruch & Peter W. Black, Conflict Resolution in Intercultural Settings: Problems
and Prospects, n CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 34, at 131; Wallace
Warfield, Public-Policy Conflict Resolution: The Nexus Between Culture and Process, in CONFLICT
RESOLUTION THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 34, at 176.
37. See supra note 2.
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But is human needs theory generalizable across conflict domains? I think it
is, up to a point. Returning to the London and Miami-Dade riots discussed earlier,
it is possible to see similarities. In both settings, despite certain demographical
differences, we see that the ontological needs of identity, recognition, and development (to use a trio associated with Burton) of low-power participants was frustrated. In Britain and the United States, the political culture institutionalized by
the ruling regime never lived up to its promise of embracing participants into a
national identity and all the associational rights that go along with it. Consequently, there was a sense of frustration felt by affected groups in not being able
to fulfill their potential, creating a spiral of unmet needs which led to an explosive
reaction.
Stretching further across domains we may find similarity within a framework
of human need, if we compare interpersonal conflict with the youth gang conflict
we have been analyzing. Writing about interpersonal conflict, Joyce Hocker and
William Wilmot discuss the importance of parties establishing identity or facesaving goals to define who they are in relation to the other party and the interaction taking place. 38 A key question here would be: "How may my self-identity be
protected or repaired in this particular conflict?" In street gangs, conflicts serve as
identity-reinforcing mechanisms and expression of group values. Members want
to "belong"39 and group conflict is one way of satisfying this ontological need. As
Burton goes on to say, "Whether we are dealing with interpersonal, community,
ethnic, or international relations, we are dealing with the same ontological needs
of people, requiringthe same analyticalprocesses of conflict resolution."40
Now, while I find myself in consensus with the core of this observation, it
also contains seeds for my departure. I agree with Burton we are dealing with the
same ontological needs across conflict domains, but I disagree rather strongly that
they require the same analytical processes. As Menkel-Meadow points out, context matters. 4' The context of identity manifestation in an interpersonal conflict is
likely to look very different than in the context of a street gang where the implications of that manifestation ricochet across a landscape of complex interactions. In
addition to context, culture matters. Imagine identity manifestation in a female
street gang as opposed to a male street gang. In either case, a conflict intervener
would be led astray if they attempted to use the same analytical process leading to
an intervention design in all conflict settings. After all, there is more to a wink
than meets the eye.
V. CONFLICT PROCESSES
Next I would like to say a word or two about process in the context of similarities or differences. The previous discussion about the application of similarities or differences in one organic theory naturally leads us to consider the intervention processes a given theory is designed to guide. In the case of third party
38. WILLIAM W. WILMOT& JOYCE L. HOCKER, INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT 73 (6th ed. 2001).
39. N.Y. City Youth Board, Prevention-Treatment-Control of Juvenile Delinquency Through Group
Work Services (1959) (unpublished paper from the Annual Spring Conference In-Service Training
Department) (on file with the author).
40. Burton. supra note 34, at 56 (emphasis added).
41. Menkel-Meadow, supra note I, at 328.
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roles, the causal path model suggests a normative relationship between conflict
origins, processes, and outcomes. In a Burtonian sense, going beyond interests to
plumb the depths of a conflict should produce a greater understanding of that conflict and the form of intervention (praxis) to be used. I share what I take to be
Menkel-Meadow's implicit concern about an inclination on the part of some of
our colleagues to engage in a kind of "one size fits all" notion of conflict analysis
and resolution-particularly with respect to mediation.
The standard forty-hour mediation training, with its emphasis on neutrality
and impartiality and near-dogmatic approach to how the process should be conducted, invites little tolerance for variables of culture, conflict conditions, and
other phenomena that abound in varied domains. Professional practice has enshrined and codified mediation so that process is divorced from its origins to produce a preferred set of outcomes. Mediation has become step-driven. If the mediator paints by the numbers, the picture should look like an agreement. We may
remember John Paul Lederach's wonderful self-reflection when he conducted
conflict resolution training in Central America several years ago.42 In reflecting
on his experience and the model he was about to introduce, he came away with a
number of observations. For example, one was that the mediation process invites
a structural formality. 43 Going from party introductions, story telling, caucusing,
and other procedural steps, the mediator is a bureaucrat, essentially ignoring the
context and cultural common sense of the participants. Lederach described mediation as an essentially linear process, one that fails to take into consideration the
reality that most people live their lives non-linearly. In a more recent iteration, a
colleague who is the manager for internal work place disputes of a major international lending agency, shared with me the frustration of working with external
contract mediators who were bent on using "the one best way" to mediate between
parties who represented a wide variety of cultures. They were remarkably unsuccessful.
What this tells us is that differences matter and we had best take them into
consideration when thinking about designing intervention approaches. But remember the admonition of throwing out the proverbial baby with the bath water?
There are circumstances and situations in conflicts where contingent techniques
can work across domains.
A few years ago, I was a member of an intervention team that conducted
training in conflict resolution and leadership with a number of national nongovernmental organization leaders in Rwanda, post the 1994 genocide. We were
sensitive to the cultural implications of our work and took great care in seeking
advice from participants and others that would inform our process. At a certain
point in the process, we felt that participants could benefit from an interest-based
negotiation skills session. We agonized well into the night if this was culturally
appropriate. Was this too rational-actor driven for people recently emerged from
a horrific civil war? Would it be seen as the imposition of a Western technique
with all of its colonizing implications? In the end, we decided to conduct the
training and found that the participants not only understood the principles, but
42. John Paul Lederach, Cultural Assumptions of the North American Model of Mediation: From a
Latin American Perspective, CONFLICT RESOL. NOTES Dec. 1987, at 23-25.
43. Id. at 23.
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ardently engaged the role plays (drawn from their relevant experiences), and were
able to critique their performances.
Evaluating the experience, our team reflected on why this particular skills
session seemed successful, despite its "Western orientation." We felt there were a
number of factors that contributed to the session's success. First, we made it clear
at the outset that we were not parachuting in to provide a few days worth of training and then returning to the safe ivory-towers of academia. We intended this to
be a multi-year commitment. Second, we offered the negotiation skills session on
the third day of the workshop, after a level of trust was developed between the
participants (Hutu and Tutsi ethnic group members) and between participants and
trainers. Third, we offered ourselves not as experts, but individuals who had expertise. Participants were free to select or reject what they felt would be useful to
them (which they did on more than one occasion). Fourth, this particular skills
session was contextualized within a larger framework of reconciliation. Finally,
we were working with mid-level leadership, many of whom were college educated. While participants reflected at various times the dominant ethnic, national,
and traditionalist culture frames, they also had jobs and other responsibilities that
contained the artifacts of middle class life. Many of the disputes and conflicts
they were dealing with (in organizations and institutional policies) fit the contours
of modem organizational life, wherever it occurs. On the other hand, I doubt this
particular training would have worked if we had attempted it in an upcountry village.
VI. CONCLUSION
I worry that whether we are devotees of similarities or differences in conflict domains or typologies, reflect so-called Western resolution models as opposed to
non Western models (What are they anyway?), favor elicitive versus prescriptive
approaches, utilize problem solving, reconciliational, or transformational approaches, in the end, they say more about who we are than what we are trying to
do. It seems to me, that as practitioners, we would be better served if we decontextualized process from its various (and competing) iconoclastic moorings
and re-contextualized approaches and techniques to the conflict setting, responding to participants' needs, rather than satisfying our professional niche. We
should shed the mantle of "expert" and consider that we are, after all, apprentices
with a willingness to learn and change standardized paradigms of conflict resolution theorizing and practice.
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